carry on his work. He had become greatly interested in his
philanthropies, and he had declared that the man who died rich
died disgraced. Moreover, new influences were rising in the steel
trade with which Carnegie had little sympathy. Its national
capital seemed to be shifting from Pittsburgh to Wall Street. New
men who knew nothing about steel but who possessed an intimate
acquaintance with stocks and bonds--J. Pierpont Morgan, George W.
Perkins, and their associates--were branching out as controllers
of large steel interests. Carnegie had no interest in Wall
Street; he has declared that he never speculated in his life and
that he would immediately dissociate himself from any partner who
would do so. This Wall Street coterie, in the years from 1898 to
1900, had made several large combinations in the steel trade.
That was the era when the trust mania had gained possession of
the American mind and when its worst features displayed
themselves. The Federal Steel Company, the American Bridge
Company, the American Steel and Wire, the National Tube Company,
all representing the assembling of large works which had been
engaged as rivals in similar enterprises, were launched, with the
usual accompaniments of "underwriting syndicates," watered stock,
and Wall Street speculation. This sort of thing made no appeal to
Andrew Carnegie. His huge enterprise had always remained
essentially a copartnership, and he had frequently expressed his
abhorrence of trusts. Yet, in spite of his wish to retire from
business and in spite of his avowed intention to die poor,
Carnegie now adopted the policy of the Sibylline leaves to all
prospective purchasers. Moore and Reid would have purchased his
interest for $157,000,000; when Rockefeller came along the price
had risen to $250,000,000; when the oil man shook his head and
retired, Carnegie immediately raised his price to $500,000,000.