convinced that, if they were to entertain a hope of success, they
must entrust their fortunes to Bolivar as supreme commander.
Their chances of success were increased furthermore by the
support of the llaneros who had been won over to the cause of
independence. Under their redoubtable chieftain, Jose Antonio
Paez, these fierce and ruthless horsemen performed many a feat of
valor in the campaigns which followed.

Once again on Venezuelan soil, Bolivar determined to transfer his
operations to the eastern part of the country, which seemed to
offer better strategic advantages than the region about Caracas.
But even here the jealousy of his officers, the insubordination
of the free lances, the stubborn resistance of the loyalists--
upheld by the wealthy and conservative classes and the able
generalship of Morillo, who had returned from New Granada--made
the situation of the Liberator all through 1817 and 1818
extremely precarious. Happily for his fading fortunes, his hands
were strengthened from abroad. The United States had recognized
the belligerency of several of the revolutionary governments in
South America and had sent diplomatic agents to them. Great
Britain had blocked every attempt of Ferdinand VII to obtain help
from the Holy Alliance in reconquering his dominions. And
Ferdinand had contributed to his own undoing by failing to heed
the urgent requests of Morillo for reinforcements to fill his
dwindling ranks. More decisive still were the services of some
five thousand British, Irish, French, and German volunteers, who
were often the mainstay of Bolivar and his lieutenants during the
later phases of the struggle, both in Venezuela and elsewhere.

For some time the Liberator had been evolving a plan of attack