they will never be wholly cleared. It was forgotten that it was the
bad government of the country which was the real cause of the
unfortunate raid. From then onwards the government might grow worse
and worse, but it was always possible to point to the raid as
justifying everything. Were the Uitlanders to have the franchise?
How could they expect it after the raid? Would Britain object to
the enormous importation of arms and obvious preparations for war?
They were only precautions against a second raid. For years the
raid stood in the way, not only of all progress, but of all
remonstrance. Through an action over which they had no control, and
which they had done their best to prevent, the British Government
was left with a bad case and a weakened moral authority.

The raiders were sent home, where the rank and file were very
properly released, and the chief officers were condemned to terms
of imprisonment which certainly did not err upon the side of
severity. Cecil Rhodes was left unpunished, he retained his place
in the Privy Council, and his Chartered Company continued to have a
corporate existence. This was illogical and inconclusive. As Kruger
said, 'It is not the dog which should be beaten, but the man who
set him on to me.' Public opinion--in spite of, or on account of, a
crowd of witnesses--was ill informed upon the exact bearings of the
question, and it was obvious that as Dutch sentiment at the Cape
appeared already to be thoroughly hostile to us, it would be
dangerous to alienate the British Africanders also by making a
martyr of their favourite leader. But whatever arguments may be
founded upon expediency, it is clear that the Boers bitterly
resented, and with justice, the immunity of Rhodes.

In the meantime, both President Kruger and his burghers had shown a