Thirdly, if the words AS THYSELF were to be understood of an
equality of affection, it would not be attended with those
consequences which perhaps may be thought to follow from it.
Suppose a person to have the same settled regard to others as to
himself; that in every deliberate scheme or pursuit he took their
interest into the account in the same degree as his own, so far as
an equality of affection would produce this: yet he would, in fact,
and ought to be, much more taken up and employed about himself, and
his own concerns, than about others, and their interests. For,
besides the one common affection toward himself and his neighbour he
would have several other particular affections, passions, appetites,
which he could not possibly feel in common both for himself and
others. Now these sensations themselves very much employ us, and
have perhaps as great influence as self-love. So far indeed as
self-love, and cool reflection upon what is for our interest, would
set us on work to gain a supply of our own several wants, so far the
love of our neighbour would make us do the same for him: but the
degree in which we are put upon seeking and making use of the means
of gratification, by the feeling of those affections, appetites, and
passions, must necessarily be peculiar to ourselves.

That there are particular passions (suppose shame, resentment) which
men seem to have, and feel in common, both for themselves and
others, makes no alteration in respect to those passions and
appetites which cannot possibly be thus felt in common. From hence
(and perhaps more things of the like kind might be mentioned) it
follows, that though there were an equality of affection to both,
yet regards to ourselves would be more prevalent than attention to
the concerns of others.