real injury, a good man will make all the allowances which are to be
made, and, without any attempts of retaliation, he will only consult
his own and other men's security for the future against injustice
and wrong.

IV. I proceed to consider, lastly, what is affirmed of the precept
now explained, that it comprehends in it all others, i.e., that to
love our neighbour as ourselves includes in it all virtues.

Now the way in which every maxim of conduct, or general speculative
assertion, when it is to be explained at large should be treated,
is, to show what are the particular truths which were designed to be
comprehended under such a general observation, how far it is
strictly true, and then the limitations, restrictions, and
exceptions, if there be exceptions, with which it is to be
understood. But it is only the former of these, namely, how far the
assertion in the text holds, and the ground of the pre-eminence
assigned to the precept of it, which in strictness comes into our
present consideration.

However, in almost everything that is said, there is somewhat to be
understood beyond what is explicitly laid down, and which we of
course supply, somewhat, I mean, which would not be commonly called
a restriction or limitation. Thus, when benevolence is said to be
the sum of virtue, it is not spoken of as a blind propension, but a
principle in reasonable creatures, and so to be directed by their
reason, for reason and reflection comes into our notion of a moral
agent. And that will lead us to consider distant consequences, as
well as the immediate tendency of an action. It will teach us that
the care of some persons, suppose children and families, is