particularly committed to our charge by Nature and Providence, as
also that there are other circumstances, suppose friendship or
former obligations, which require that we do good to some,
preferably to others. Reason, considered merely as subservient to
benevolence, as assisting to produce the greatest good, will teach
us to have particular regard to these relations and circumstances,
because it is plainly for the good of the world that they should be
regarded. And as there are numberless cases in which,
notwithstanding appearances, we are not competent judges, whether a
particular action will upon the whole do good or harm, reason in the
same way will teach us to be cautious how we act in these cases of
uncertainty. It will suggest to our consideration which is the
safer side; how liable we are to be led wrong by passion and private
interest; and what regard is due to laws, and the judgment of
mankind. All these things must come into consideration, were it
only in order to determine which way of acting is likely to produce
the greatest good. Thus, upon supposition that it were in the
strictest sense true, without limitation, that benevolence includes
in it all virtues, yet reason must come in as its guide and
director, in order to attain its own end, the end of benevolence,
the greatest public good. Reason, then, being thus included, let us
now consider the truth of the assertion itself.

First, It is manifest that nothing can be of consequence to mankind
or any creature but happiness. This, then, is all which any person
can, in strictness of speaking, be said to have a right to. We can
therefore OWE NO MAN ANYTHING, but only to farther and promote his
happiness, according to our abilities. And therefore a disposition
and endeavour to do good to all with whom we have to do, in the
degree and manner which the different relations we stand in to them