hath in such a course, suppose of study, particular friendships, or
in any other; nothing, I say, is more common than to hear such a
question put in a way which supposes no gain, advantage, or
interest, but as a means to somewhat further: and if so, then there
is no such thing at all as real interest, gain, or advantage. This
is the same absurdity with respect to life as an infinite series of
effects without a cause is in speculation. The gain, advantage, or
interest consists in the delight itself, arising from such a
faculty's having its object: neither is there any such thing as
happiness or enjoyment but what arises from hence. The pleasures of
hope and of reflection are not exceptions: the former being only
this happiness anticipated; the latter the same happiness enjoyed
over again after its time. And even the general expectation of
future happiness can afford satisfaction only as it is a present
object to the principle of self-love.

It was doubtless intended that life should be very much a pursuit to
the gross of mankind. But this is carried so much further than is
reasonable that what gives immediate satisfaction, i.e. our present
interest, is scarce considered as our interest at all. It is
inventions which have only a remote tendency towards enjoyment,
perhaps but a remote tendency towards gaining the means only of
enjoyment, which are chiefly spoken of as useful to the world. And
though this way of thinking were just with respect to the imperfect
state we are now in, where we know so little of satisfaction without
satiety, yet it must be guarded against when we are considering the
happiness of a state of perfection; which happiness being enjoyment
and not hope, must necessarily consist in this, that our affections
have their objects, and rest in those objects as an end, i.e. be
satisfied with them. This will further appear in the sequel of this