discourse.

Of the several affections, or inward sensations, which particular
objects excite in man, there are some, the having of which implies
the love of them, when they are reflected upon. {29} This cannot be
said of all our affections, principles, and motives of action. It
were ridiculous to assert that a man upon reflection hath the same
kind of approbation of the appetite of hunger or the passion of fear
as he hath of goodwill to his fellow-creatures. To be a just, a
good, a righteous man, plainly carries with it a peculiar affection
to or love of justice, goodness, righteousness, when these
principles are the objects of contemplation.

Now if a man approves of, or hath an affection to, any principle in
and for itself, incidental things allowed for, it will be the same
whether he views it in his own mind or in another; in himself or in
his neighbour. This is the account of our approbation of, or moral
love and affection to good characters; which cannot but be in those
who have any degrees of real goodness in themselves, and who discern
and take notice of the same principle in others.

From observation of what passes within ourselves, our own actions,
and the behaviour of others, the mind may carry on its reflections
as far as it pleases; much beyond what we experience in ourselves,
or discern in our fellow creatures. It may go on and consider
goodness as become a uniform continued principle of action, as
conducted by reason, and forming a temper and character absolutely
good and perfect, which is in a higher sense excellent, and
proportionably the object of love and approbation.