Let us then suppose a creature perfect according to his created
nature--let his form be human, and his capacities no more than equal
to those of the chief of men--goodness shall be his proper
character, with wisdom to direct it, and power within some certain
determined sphere of action to exert it: but goodness must be the
simple actuating principle within him; this being the moral quality
which is amiable, or the immediate object of love as distinct from
other affections of approbation. Here then is a finite object for
our mind to tend towards, to exercise itself upon: a creature,
perfect according to his capacity, fixed, steady, equally unmoved by
weak pity or more weak fury and resentment; forming the justest
scheme of conduct; going on undisturbed in the execution of it,
through the several methods of severity and reward, towards his end,
namely, the general happiness of all with whom he hath to do, as in
itself right and valuable. This character, though uniform in
itself, in its principle, yet exerting itself in different ways, or
considered in different views, may by its appearing variety move
different affections. Thus, the severity of justice would not
affect us in the same way as an act of mercy. The adventitious
qualities of wisdom and power may be considered in themselves; and
even the strength of mind which this immovable goodness supposes may
likewise be viewed as an object of contemplation distinct from the
goodness itself. Superior excellence of any kind, as well as
superior wisdom and power, is the object of awe and reverence to all
creatures, whatever their moral character be; but so far as
creatures of the lowest rank were good, so far the view of this
character, as simply good, must appear amiable to them, be the
object of, or beget love. Further suppose we were conscious that
this superior person so far approved of us that we had nothing
servilely to fear from him; that he was really our friend, and kind