prefer one place, one prospect, the conversation of one man to that
of another. Does not every affection necessarily imply that the
object of it be itself loved? If it be not it is not the object of
the affection. You may, and ought if you can, but it is a great
mistake to think you can love or fear or hate anything, from
consideration that such love or fear or hatred may be a means of
obtaining good or avoiding evil. But the question whether we ought
to love God for His sake or for our own being a mere mistake in
language, the real question which this is mistaken for will, I
suppose, be answered by observing that the goodness of God already
exercised towards us, our present dependence upon Him, and our
expectation of future benefits, ought, and have a natural tendency,
to beget in us the affection of gratitude, and greater love towards
Him, than the same goodness exercised towards others; were it only
for this reason, that every affection is moved in proportion to the
sense we have of the object of it; and we cannot but have a more
lively sense of goodness when exercised towards ourselves than when
exercised towards others. I added expectation of future benefits
because the ground of that expectation is present goodness.

Thus Almighty God is the natural object of the several affections,
love, reverence, fear, desire of approbation. For though He is
simply one, yet we cannot but consider Him in partial and different
views. He is in himself one uniform Being, and for ever the same
without VARIABLENESS OR SHADOW OF TURNING; but His infinite
greatness, His goodness, His wisdom, are different objects to our
mind. To which is to be added, that from the changes in our own
characters, together with His unchangeableness, we cannot but
consider ourselves as more or less the objects of His approbation,
and really be so. For if He approves what is good, He cannot,