{11} Prov. x. 19.

{12} Mark xii. 38, 40.

{13} There being manifestly this appearance of men's substituting
others for themselves, and being carried out and affected towards
them as towards themselves; some persons, who have a system which
excludes every affection of this sort, have taken a pleasant method
to solve it; and tell you it is NOT ANOTHER you are at all concerned
about, but your SELF ONLY, when you feel the affection called
compassion, i.e. Here is a plain matter of fact, which men cannot
reconcile with the general account they think fit to give of things:
they therefore, instead of that manifest fact, substitute ANOTHER,
which is reconcilable to their own scheme. For does not everybody
by compassion mean an affection, the object of which is another in
distress? instead of this, but designing to have it mistaken for
this, they speak of an affection or passion, the object of which is
ourselves, or danger to ourselves. Hobbes defines PITY,
IMAGINATION, OR FICTION OF FUTURE CALAMITY TO OURSELVES, PROCEEDING
FROM THE SENSE (he means sight or knowledge) OF ANOTHER MAN'S
CALAMITY. Thus fear and compassion would be the same idea, and a
fearful and a compassionate man the same character, which every one
immediately sees are totally different. Further, to those who give
any scope to their affections, there is no perception or inward
feeling more universal than this: that one who has been merciful
and compassionate throughout the course of his behaviour should
himself be treated with kindness, if he happens to fall into
circumstances of distress. Is fear, then, or cowardice, so great a
recommendation to the favour of the bulk of mankind? Or is it not