life consists; or else, if they do consider it, that they will not
act conformably to what is the result of that consideration--i.e.,
reasonable concern for themselves, or cool self-love, is prevailed
over by passions and appetite? So that from what appears there is
no ground to assert that those principles in the nature of man,
which most directly lead to promote the good of our fellow-
creatures, are more generally or in a greater degree violated than
those which most directly lead us to promote our own private good
and happiness.

The sum of the whole is plainly this: The nature of man considered
in his single capacity, and with respect only to the present world,
is adapted and leads him to attain the greatest happiness he can for
himself in the present world. The nature of man considered in his
public or social capacity leads him to right behaviour in society,
to that course of life which we call virtue. Men follow or obey
their nature in both these capacities and respects to a certain
degree, but not entirely: their actions do not come up to the whole
of what their nature leads them to in either of these capacities or
respects: and they often violate their nature in both; i.e., as
they neglect the duties they owe to their fellow-creatures, to which
their nature leads them, and are injurious, to which their nature is
abhorrent, so there is a manifest negligence in men of their real
happiness or interest in the present world, when that interest is
inconsistent with a present gratification; for the sake of which
they negligently, nay, even knowingly, are the authors and
instruments of their own misery and ruin. Thus they are as often
unjust to themselves as to others, and for the most part are equally
so to both by the same actions.