happiness or misery of our fellow-creatures. And this is in fart
the ease, for there are certain dispositions of mind, and certain
actions, which are in themselves approved or disapproved by mankind,
abstracted from the consideration of their tendency to the happiness
or misery of the world approved or disapproved by reflection, by
that principle within, whirls is the guile of life, the judge of
right and wrong. Numberless instances of this kind might be
mentioned. There are pieces of treachery, which in themselves
appear base and detestable to every one. There are actions, which
perhaps can scarce have any other general name given them than
indecencies, which yet are odious and shocking to human nature.
There is such a thing as meanness, a little mind, which as it is
quite distinct from incapacity, so it raises a dislike and
disapprobation quite different from that contempt, which men are too
apt to have, of mere folly. On the other hand, what we call
greatness of mind is the object of another most of approbation, than
superior understanding. Fidelity, honour, strict justice, are
themselves approved in the highest degree, abstracted from the
consideration of their tendency. Now, whether it be thought that
each of these are connected with benevolence in our nature, amid so
may he considered as the same thing with it, or whether some of them
he thought an inferior kind of virtues and vices, somewhat like
natural beauties and deformities, or lastly, plain exceptions to the
general rule, thus such however is certain, that the things now
instanced in, and numberless others, are approved or disapproved by
mankind in general, in quite another view than as conducive to the
happiness or misery of the world.

{29} St. Austin observes, Amor ipse ordinate amandus est, quo bene
amatur quod amandum sit, ut sit in nobis virtue qua vivitur bene,