There can be no doubt but that several propensions or instincts,
several principles in the heart of man, carry him to society, and to
contribute to the happiness of it, in a sense and a manner in which
no inward principle leads him to evil. These principles,
propensions, or instincts which lead him to do good are approved of
by a certain faculty within, quite distinct from these propensions
themselves. All this hath been fully made out in the foregoing
discourse.

But it may be said, "What is all this, though true, to the purpose
of virtue and religion? these require, not only that we do good to
others when we are led this way, by benevolence or reflection
happening to be stronger than other principles, passions, or
appetites, but likewise that the WHOLE character be formed upon
thought and reflection; that EVERY action be directed by some
determinate rule, some other rule than the strength and prevalency
of any principle or passion. What sign is there in our nature (for
the inquiry is only about what is to be collected from thence) that
this was intended by its Author? Or how does so various and fickle
a temper as that of man appear adapted thereto? It may indeed be
absurd and unnatural for men to act without any reflection; nay,
without regard to that particular kind of reflection which you call
conscience, because this does belong to our nature. For as there
never was a man but who approved one place, prospect, building,
before another, so it does not appear that there ever was a man who
would not have approved an action of humanity rather than of
cruelty; interest and passion being quite out of the case. But
interest and passion do come in, and are often too strong for and
prevail over reflection and conscience. Now as brutes have various