satisfaction. Self-love, then, though confined to the interest of
the present world, does in general perfectly coincide with virtue,
and leads us to one and the same course of life. But, whatever
exceptions there are to this, which are much fewer than they are
commonly thought, all shall be set right at the final distribution
of things. It is a manifest absurdity to suppose evil prevailing
finally over good, under the conduct and administration of a perfect
mined.

The whole argument, which I have been now insisting upon, may be
thus summed up, and given you in one view. The nature of man is
adapted to some course of action or other. Upon comparing some
actions with this nature, they appear suitable and correspondent to
it: from comparison of other actions with the same nature, there
arises to our view some unsuitableness or disproportion. The
correspondence of actions to the nature of the agent renders them
natural; their disproportion to it, unnatural. That an action is
correspondent to the nature of the agent does not arise from its
being agreeable to the principle which happens to be the strongest:
for it may be so and yet be quite disproportionate to the nature of
the agent. The correspondence therefore, or disproportion, arises
from somewhat else. This can be nothing but a difference in nature
and kind, altogether distinct from strength, between the inward
principles. Some then are in nature and kind superior to others.
And the correspondence arises from the action being conformable to
the higher principle; and the unsuitableness from its being contrary
to it. Reasonable self-love and conscience are the chief or
superior principles in the nature of man; because an action may be
suitable to this nature, though all other principles be violated,
but becomes unsuitable if either of those are. Conscience and self-