kind; that, on the contrary, even the bare exercise of such
affections would itself be for the good and happiness of the world;
and the imperfection of the higher principles of reason and religion
in man, the little influence they have upon our practice, and the
strength and prevalency of contrary ones, plainly require these
affections to be a restraint upon these latter, and a supply to the
deficiencies of the former.

First, The very exercise itself of these affections in a just and
reasonable manner and degree would upon the whole increase the
satisfactions and lessen the miseries of life.

It is the tendency and business of virtue and religion to procure,
as much as may be, universal good-will, trust, and friendship
amongst mankind. If this could be brought to obtain; and each man
enjoyed the happiness of others, as every one does that of a friend;
and looked upon the success and prosperity of his neighbour as every
one does upon that of his children and family; it is too manifest to
be insisted upon how much the enjoyments of life would be increased.
There would be so much happiness introduced into the world, without
any deduction or inconvenience from it, in proportion as the precept
of REJOICING WITH THOSE WHO REJOICE was universally obeyed. Our
Saviour has owned this good affection as belonging to our nature in
the parable of the LOST SHEEP, and does not think it to the
disadvantage of a perfect state to represent its happiness as
capable of increase from reflection upon that of others.

But since in such a creature as man, compassion or sorrow for the
distress of others seems so far necessarily connected with joy in
their prosperity, as that whoever rejoices in one must unavoidably