to a more promiscuous and undistinguished distribution of favours;
to those who are not, as well as those who are, necessitous; whereas
the object of compassion is misery. But in the comparison, and
where there is not a possibility of both, mercy is to have the
preference: the affection of compassion manifestly leads us to this
preference. Thus, to relieve the indigent and distressed, to single
out the unhappy, from whom can be expected no returns either of
present entertainment or future service, for the objects of our
favours; to esteem a man's being friendless as a recommendation;
dejection, and incapacity of struggling through the world, as a
motive for assisting him; in a word, to consider these circumstances
of disadvantage, which are usually thought a sufficient reason for
neglect and overlooking a person, as a motive for helping him
forward: this is the course of benevolence which compassion marks
out and directs us to: this is that humanity which is so peculiarly
becoming our nature and circumstances in this world.

To these considerations, drawn from the nature of man, must be added
the reason of the thing itself we are recommending, which accords to
and shows the same. For since it is so much more in our power to
lessen the misery of our fellow-creatures than to promote their
positive happiness; in cases where there is an inconsistency, we
shall be likely to do much more good by setting ourselves to
mitigate the former than by endeavouring to promote the latter. Let
the competition be between the poor and the rich. It is easy, you
will say, to see which will have the preference. True; but the
question is, which ought to have the preference? What proportion is
there between the happiness produced by doing a favour to the
indigent, and that produced by doing the same favour to one in easy
circumstances? It is manifest that the addition of a very large