existed and could be traced--a position which invited arbitration
in place of force.

Both Canning and Adams won victories, but neither realized his
full hopes. Canning prevented the interference of Europe in
Spanish America, broke up the Quadruple Alliance, rendered the
Holy Alliance a shadow, and restored a balance of power that
meant safety for England for almost a hundred years; but he
failed to dictate American policy. Adams on his part detached the
United States from European politics without throwing England
into the arms of Europe. He took advantage of the divisions of
the Old World to establish the priority of the United States in
American affairs; but he failed in his later attempt to unite all
the Americas in cordial cooperation. Earnest as was his desire
and hard as he strove in 1825 when he had become President with
Clay as his Secretary of State, Adams found that the differences
in point of view between the United States and the other American
powers were too great to permit a Pan-American policy. The Panama
Congress on which he built his hopes failed, and for fifty years
the project lay dormant.

Under the popular name of the Monroe Doctrine, however, Adams's
policy has played a much larger part in world affairs than he
expected. Without the force of law either in this country or
between nations, this doctrine took a firm hold of the American
imagination and became a national ideal, while other nations have
at least in form taken cognizance of it. The Monroe Doctrine has
survived because Adams did not invent its main tenets but found
them the dominating principles of American international
politics; his work, like that of his contemporary John Marshall,