British Navy, gave Britain the advantage, or would eventually
have done so if a canal had been constructed. Subsequently the
majority of Americans decided that such a canal must be under the
sole control of the United States, and the treaty then stood as a
stumbling block in the way of the realization of this idea.

More immediately important, however, and a great wrench to
American policies, was the provision that neither power "will ever
erect or maintain any fortifications commanding" the canal "or
occupy, or fortify, or colonize, or assume or exercise any
dominion over...any part of Central America." This condition
violated Adams's principle that the United States was not on the
same footing with any European power in American affairs and
should not be bound by any self-denying ordinance, and actually
it reversed the principle against the United States. An
explanatory note accompanying the treaty recognized that this
provision did not apply to Belize and her dependencies, and Great
Britain promptly denied that it applied to any rights she already
possessed in Central America, including the Mosquito protectorate
and certain Bay Islands which were claimed by Great Britain as
dependencies of Belize and by Honduras as a part of her
territory.

In vain did Webster, who succeeded Clayton, seek an agreement.
His term of office passed, and the controversy fell into the
hands of Lord Palmerston, the jingoistic spirit who began at this
time to dominate British foreign policy, and of James Buchanan,
who, known to us as a spineless seeker after peace where there
was no peace, was at this time riding into national leadership on
a wave of expansionist enthusiasm. Buchanan and Palmerston