concealed his satisfaction and bargained closely. Stoeckl asked
ten million dollars; Seward offered five. Stoeckl proposed to
split the difference; Seward agreed, if Stoeckl would knock off
the odd half million. Stoeckl accepted, on condition that Seward
add two hundred thousand as special compensation to the Russian
American Company. It was midnight of the 29th of March when
$7,200,000 was made the price. Seward roused Sumner from bed, and
the three worked upon the form of a treaty until four o'clock in
the morning. No captains of industry could show greater decision.

The treaty, however, was not yet a fact. The Senate must approve,
and its approval could not be taken for granted. The temper of
the majority of Americans toward expansion had changed. The
experiences of the later fifties had caused many to look upon
expansion as a Southern heresy. Carl Schurz a little later argued
that we had already taken in all those regions the climate of
which would allow healthy self-government and that we should
annex no tropics. Hamilton Fish, then Secretary of State, wrote
in 1873 that popular sentiment was, for the time being, against
all expansion. In fact, among the people of the United States the
idea was developing that expansion was contrary to their national
policy, and their indisposition to expand became almost a
passion. They rejected Santo Domingo and the Danish Islands and
would not press any negotiations for Canada.

What saved the Alaska Treaty from a similar disapproval was not
any conviction that Alaska was worth seven million dollars,
although Sumner convinced those who took the trouble to read,
that the financial bargain was not a bad one. The chief factor in
the purchase of Alaska was almost pure sentiment. Throughout