wastefulness. Yet Blaine rallied Congress to his support, as well
as a great part of American sentiment.

The situation, which had now become acute, was aggravated by the
fact that most American public men of this period did not
separate their foreign and domestic politics. Too many sought to
secure the important Irish vote by twisting the tail of the
British lion. The Republicans, in particular, sought to identify
protection with patriotism and were making much of the fact that
the recall of Lord Sackville-West, the British Minister, had been
forced because he had advised a correspondent to vote for
Cleveland. It spoke volumes for the fundamental good sense of the
two nations that, when relations were so strained, they could
agree to submit their differences to arbitration. For this happy
outcome credit must be given to the cooler heads on both sides,
but equal credit must be given to their legacy from the cool
heads which had preceded them. The United States and Great
Britain had acquired the habit of submitting to judicial decision
their disputes, even those closely touching honor, and this habit
kept them steady.

In accepting arbitration in 1892, the United States practically
gave up her case, although Blaine undoubtedly believed it could
be defended, and in spite of the fact that it was ably presented
by John W. Foster from a brief prepared by the American counsel,
Edward J. Phelps, Frederic R. Coudert, and James C. Carter. The
tribunal assembled at Paris decided that Bering Sea was open and
determined certain facts upon which a subsequent commission
assessed damages of nearly half a million against the United
States for the seizure of British vessels during the period in