instead of personal conferences. People blenched at the thought
of war; stocks fell; the attention of the whole world was
arrested. The innumerable and intimate bonds of friendship and
interest which would thus have to be broken merely because of an
insignificant jog in a boundary remote from both the nations made
war between the United States and Great Britain seem absolutely
inconceivable, until people realized that neither country could
yield without an admission of defeat both galling to national
pride and involving fundamental principles of conduct and policy
for the future.

Great Britain in particular stood amazed at Cleveland's position.
The general opinion was that peace must be maintained and that
diplomats must find a formula which would save both peace and
appearances. Yet before this public opinion could be
diplomatically formulated, a new episode shook the British sense
of security. Germany again appeared as a menace and, as in the
case of Samoa, the international situation thus produced tended
to develop a realization of the kinship between Great Britain and
the United States. Early in January, 1896, the Jameson raid into
the Transvaal was defeated, and the Kaiser immediately
telegraphed his congratulations to President Krtiger. In view of
the possibilities involved in this South African situation,
British public opinion demanded that her diplomats maintain peace
with the United States, with or without the desired formula.

The British Government, however, was not inclined to act with
undue haste. It became apparent even to the most panicky that war
with the United States could not come immediately, for the
American Commission of Inquiry must first report. For a time Lord