A rectitude of judgment in the arts, which may be called a good taste,
does in a great measure depend upon sensibility; because, if the mind
has no bent to the pleasures of the imagination, it will never apply
itself sufficiently to works of that species to acquire a competent
knowledge in them. But, though a degree of sensibility is requisite to
form a good judgment, yet a good judgment does not necessarily arise
from a quick sensibility of pleasure.


MORAL EFFECTS OF LANGUAGE.

This arises chiefly from these three causes. First. That we take an
extraordinary part in the passions of others, and that we are easily
affected and brought into sympathy by any tokens which are shown of
them; and there are no tokens which can express all the circumstances of
most passions so fully as words; so that if a person speaks upon any
subject, he can not only convey the subject to you, but likewise the
manner in which he is himself affected by it. Certain it is, that the
influence of most things on our passions is not so much from the things
themselves, as from our opinions concerning them; and these again depend
very much on the opinions of other men, conveyable for the most part by
words only. Secondly. There are many things of a very affecting nature,
which can seldom occur in the reality, but the words that represent them
often do; and thus they have an opportunity of making a deep impression
and taking root in the mind, whilst the idea of the reality was
transient; and to some perhaps never really occurred in any shape, to
whom it is notwithstanding very affecting, as war, death, famine, etc.
Besides, many ideas have never been at all presented to the senses of
any men but by words, as God, angels, devils, heaven, and hell, all of
which have, however, a great influence over the passions. Thirdly. By