plainly perceive its effects, in much violence, in a great spirit of
innovation, and a general disorder in all the functions of government. I
keep my eye solely on this system; if I speak of those measures which
have arisen from it, it will be so far only as they illustrate the
general scheme. This is the fountain of all those bitter waters, of
which, through an hundred different conduits, we have drunk until we are
ready to burst. The discretionary power of the Crown in the formation of
ministry, abused by bad or weak men, has given rise to a system which,
without directly violating the letter of any law, operates against the
spirit of the whole constitution.

A plan of favouritism for our executory government is essentially at
variance with the plan of our legislature. One great end undoubtedly of
a mixed government like ours, composed of monarchy, and of controls, on
the part of the higher people and the lower, is that the prince shall
not be able to violate the laws. This is useful indeed and fundamental.
But this, even at first view, in no more than a negative advantage; an
armour merely defensive. It is therefore next in order, and equal in
importance, THAT THE DISCRETIONARY POWERS WHICH ARE NECESSARILY VESTED
IN THE MONARCH, WHETHER FOR THE EXECUTION OF THE LAWS, OR FOR THE
NOMINATION TO MAGISTRACY AND OFFICE, OR FOR CONDUCTING THE AFFAIRS OF
PEACE AND WAR, OR FOR ORDERING THE REVENUE, SHOULD ALL BE EXERCISED UPON
PUBLIC PRINCIPLES AND NATIONAL GROUNDS, AND NOT ON THE LIKINGS OR
PREJUDICES, THE INTRIGUES OR POLICIES, OF A COURT.


ADMINISTRATION AND LEGISLATION.

In arbitrary governments, the constitution of the ministry follows the
constitution of the legislature. Both the law and the magistrate are the