administration, as well as in the whole. If any individual were to
decline his appointments, it might give an unfair advantage to
ostentatious ambition over unpretending service; it might breed
invidious comparisons; it might tend to destroy whatever little unity
and agreement may be found among ministers. And, after all, when an
ambitious man had run down his competitors by a fallacious show of
disinterestedness, and fixed himself in power by that means, what
security is there that he would not change his course, and claim as an
indemnity ten times more than he has given up?


RATIONAL LIBERTY.

Liberty, too, must be limited in order to be possessed. The degree of
restraint it is impossible in any case to settle precisely. But it ought
to be the constant aim of every wise public council to find out by
cautious experiments, and rational, cool endeavours, with how little,
not how much, of this restraint the community can subsist. For liberty
is a good to be improved, and not an evil to be lessened. It is not only
a private blessing of the first order, but the vital spring and energy
of the state itself, which has just so much life and vigour as there is
liberty in it. But whether liberty be advantageous or not (for I know it
is a fashion to decry the very principle), none will dispute that peace
is a blessing; and peace must in the course of human affairs be
frequently bought by some indulgence and toleration at least to liberty.
For as the sabbath (though of Divine institution) was made for man, not
man for the sabbath, government, which can claim no higher origin or
authority, in its exercise at least, ought to conform to the exigencies
of the time, and the temper and character of the people with whom it is
concerned; and not always to attempt violently to bend the people to