| have to rectify their information and
| reduce a double delusion: the
| illusion that the sensible qualities
| offered by them are the real
| determinations of things and the
| illusion that things are divided
| according to our human sensibility
| (IV, 194 et sq.).
|
| Thus we can understand a third
| critique against the old method: the
| Aristotelian logic rests upon a
| metaphysics which believes that
| sensible experience gives the human
| mind the things as they are, with
| their essential qualities, and that
| philosophy can be satisfied with
| taking empirical phenomena for the
| true reality of nature, thanks to a
| mere generalization that erases the
| particular circumstances of
| existence. Nevertheless, empirically
| qualified existences are not to be
| mistaken for the things themselves.
| So far, Bacon is undoubtedly a
| modern, since he claims that the
| object of knowledge is reality and
| that reality, if it can be
| inductively known from empirical
| data, cannot be reduced to the matter