| which will be able to carry the human
| mind from empirical data to the real
| causes, to supply it with the means of
| invention, to justify the position of
| first truths and to manage a secure
| deduction of practical consequences.
| And, as the critique of the old logic
| has to be understood as a whole, so
| the interpretation of nature has to be
| conceived as a continuous attempt,
| proceeding by degrees, by successive
| stages, to invent truth and to derive
| works. ("Bacon's method of science",
| in: THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO BACON.
| ed. by Markku Peltonen [1996], 76-82).
|
| 1C.
| Harvey Wheeler comments:
|
| Most historians of the philosophy of science
| are unfamiliar with Bacon's transformation
| of his innovative theory of juridical
| lawfinding into scientific empiricist
| lawfinding. Baconian law-finding is not to
| be confused with cause-finding in modern
| "classical" physics.
|
| Bacon's quest changed as he matured. In
| VALERIUS TERMINUS he is writing in
| English, trying to lay the groundwork for