triumph of their respective causes and amid circumstances of
great discouragement. Both worked through and for great
institutions which preceded them and which have survived them.
And, as the achievements of Hildebrand cannot be justly
appreciated without some knowledge of the ecclesiastical system
which he did so much to develop, neither can the career of John
Marshall be understood without some knowledge of the organization
of the tribunal through which he wrought and whose power he did
so much to exalt. The first chapter in the history of John
Marshall and his influence upon the laws of the land must
therefore inevitably deal with the historical conditions
underlying the judicial system of which it is the capstone.

The vital defect of the system of government provided by the soon
obsolete Articles of Confederation lay in the fact that it
operated not upon the individual citizens of the United States
but upon the States in their corporate capacities. As a
consequence the prescribed duties of any law passed by Congress
in pursuance of powers derived from the Articles of Confederation
could not be enforced. Theoretically, perhaps, Congress had the
right to coerce the States to perform their duties; at any rate,
a Congressional Committee headed by Madison so decided at the
very moment (1781) when the Articles were going into effect. But
practically such a course of coercion, requiring in the end the
exercise of military power, was out of the question. Whence were
to come the forces for military operations against recalcitrant
States? From sister States which had themselves neglected their
constitutional duties on various occasions? The history of the
German Empire has demonstrated that the principle of state
coercion is entirely feasible when a single powerful State