respecting a great political fraud.

It is a principle particularly applicable to absolute governments that a
prince should change his ministers as seldom as possible, and never
except upon serious grounds. Bonaparte acted on this principle when
First Consul, and also when he became Emperor. He often allowed unjust
causes to influence him, but he never dismissed a Minister without cause;
indeed, he more than once, without any reason, retained Ministers longer
than he ought to have done in the situations in which he had placed them.
Bonaparte's tenacity in this respect, in some instances, produced very
opposite results. For instance, it afforded M. Gaudin' time to establish
a degree of order in the administration of Finance which before his time
had never existed; and on the other hand, it enabled M. Decres to reduce
the Ministry of Marine to an unparalleled state of confusion.

Bonaparte saw nothing in men but helps and obstacles. On the 18th
Brumaire Fouche was a help. The First Consul feared that he would become
an obstacle; it was necessary, therefore, to think of dismissing him.
Bonaparte's most sincere friends had from the beginning been opposed to
Fouche's having any share in the Government. But their disinterested
advice produced no other result than their own disgrace, so influential a
person had Fouche become. How could it be otherwise? Fouche was
identified with the Republic by the death of the King, for which he had
voted; with the Reign of Terror by his sanguinary missions to Lyons and
Nevers; with the Consulate by his real though perhaps exaggerated
services; with Bonaparte by the charm with which he might be said to have
fascinated him; with Josephine by the enmity of the First Consul's
brothers. Who would believe it? Fouche ranked the enemies of the
Revolution amongst his warmest partisans. They overwhelmed him with
eulogy, to the disparagement even of the Head of the State, because the