between Moreau and Pichegru. The latter general, who was banished on the
18th Fructidor 4th (September 1797), had not obtained the First Consul's
permission to return to France. He lived in England, where he awaited a
favourable opportunity for putting his old projects into execution.
Moreau was in Pains, but no longer appeared at the levees or parties of
the First Consul, and the enmity of both generals against Bonaparte,
openly avowed on the part of Pichegru; and still disguised by Moreau, was
a secret to nobody. But as everything was prosperous with Bonaparte he
evinced contempt rather than fear of the two generals. His apprehensions
were, indeed, tolerably allayed by the absence of the one and the
character of the other. Moreau's name had greater weight with the army
than that of Pichegru; and those who were plotting the overthrow of the
Consular Government knew that that measure could not be attempted with
any chance of success without the assistance of Moreau. The moment was
inopportune; but, being initiated in some secrets of the British Cabinet,
they knew that the peace was but a truce, and they determined to profit
by that truce to effect a reconciliation which might afterwards secure a
community of interests. Moreau and Pichegru had not been friends since
Moreau sent to the Directory the papers seized in M. de Klinglin's
carriage, which placed Pichegru's treason in so clear a light. Since
that period Pichegru's name possessed no influence over the minds of the
soldiers, amongst whom he had very few partisans, whilst the name of
Moreau was dear to all who had conquered under his command.

Fauche Borel's design was to compromise Moreau without bringing him to
any decisive step. Moreau's natural indolence, and perhaps it may be
said his good sense, induced him to adopt the maxim that it was necessary
to let men and things take their course; for temporizing policy is often
as useful in politics as in war. Besides, Moreau was a sincere
Republican; and if his habit of indecision had permitted him to adopt any