projects of France with respect to Turkey, and this complaint originated
in General Sebastiani's mission to Egypt. On that point I can take upon
me to say that the English Government was not misinformed. Bonaparte too
frequently spoke to are of his ideas respecting the East, and his project
of attacking the English power in India, to leave any doubt of his ever
having renounced them. The result of all the reproaches which the two
Governments addressed to each other was, that neither acted with good
faith.

The First Consul, in a communication to the Legislative Body on the state
of France and on her foreign relations; had said, "England, single-
handed, cannot cope with France." This sufficed to irritate the
susceptibility of English pride, and the British Cabinet affected to
regard it as a threat. However, it was no such thing. When Bonaparte
threatened, his words were infinitely more energetic. The passage above
cited was merely au assurance to France; and if we only look at the past
efforts and sacrifices made by England to stir up enemies to France on
the Continent, we may be justified in supposing that her anger at
Bonaparte's declaration arose from a conviction of its truth. Singly
opposed to France, England could doubtless have done her much harm,
especially by assailing the scattered remnants of her navy; but she could
have done nothing against France on the Continent. The two powers,
unaided by allies, might have continued long at war without any
considerable acts of hostility.

The first effect of the declaration of war by England was the invasion of
Hanover by the French troops under General Mortier. The telegraphic
despatch by which this news was communicated to Paris was as laconic as
correct, and contained, in a few words, the complete history of the
expedition. It ran as follows: "The French are masters of the Electorate