would be madness" (1st July 1808). On the other hand, the tone of
his correspondence in 1808 seams calculated to make Austria believe
that war was inevitable, and that her forces, "so inferior to those
of France before the insurrection in Spain, will at least be equal
to them immediately after that event" (tome ii. p. 808). What is
curious is that Metternich's conduct towards Napoleon while
Ambassador had led even such men as Duke Dalberg to believe that he
was really so well disposed towards Napoleon as to serve his cause
more than that of Austria.

M. Metternich, who had instructions from his Court, gave no satisfactory
explanation of those circumstances to Napoleon, who immediately raised a
conscription, and brought soldiers from Spain into Germany.

It was necessary, also, to come to an understanding with Russia, who,
being engaged with her war in Finland and Turkey, appeared desirous
neither to enter into alliance with Austria nor to afford her support.
What, in fact, was the Emperor Alexander's situation with respect to
France? He had signed a treaty of peace at Tilsit which he felt had been
forced upon him, and he knew that time alone would render it possible for
him to take part in a contest which it was evident would again be renewed
either with Prussia or Austria.

Every person of common sense must have perceived that Austria, in taking
up arms, reckoned, if not on the assistance, at least on the neutrality
of Russia. Russia was then engaged with two enemies, the Swedes and the
Turks, over whom she hoped to triumph. She therefore rejoiced to see
France again engage in a struggle with Austria, and there was no doubt
that she would take advantage of any chances favourable to the latter
power to join her in opposing the encroachments of France. I never could