were, and especially Murat, though be was very differently situated from
Berthier."

The negotiations which Bonaparte opened with Alexander, when he yet
wished to seem averse to war, resembled those oratorical paraphrases
which do not prevent us from coming to the conclusion we wish. The two
Emperors equally desired war; the one with the view of consolidating his
power, and the other in the hope of freeing himself from a yoke which
threatened to reduce him to a state of vassalage, for it was little short
of this to require a power like Russia to close her ports against England
for the mere purpose of favouring the interests of France. At that time
only two European powers were not tied to Napoleon's fate--Sweden and
Turkey. Napoleon was anxious to gain the alliance of these two powers.
With respect to Sweden his efforts were vain; and though, in fact, Turkey
was then at war with Russia, yet the Grand Seignior was not now, as at
the time of Sebastiani's embassy, subject to the influence of France.

The peace, which was soon concluded at Bucharest, between Russia, and
Turkey increased Napoleon's embarrassment. The left of the Russian army,
secured by the neutrality of Turkey, was reinforced by Bagration's corps
from Moldavia: it subsequently occupied the right of the Beresina, and
destroyed the last hope of saving the wreck of the French army. It is
difficult to conceive how Turkey could have allowed the consideration of
injuries she had received from France to induce her to terminate the war
with Russia when France was attacking that power with immense forces.
The Turks never had a fairer opportunity for taking revenge on Russia,
and, unfortunately for Napoleon, they suffered it to escape.

Napoleon was not more successful when he sought the alliance of a Prince
whose fortune he had made, and who was allied to his family, but with