in the protocol their reasons for rejecting the extraordinary project of
the French Minister. For my part, I was convinced, for the reasons I
have mentioned, that the Emperor would never agree to sign the conditions
proposed in the ultimatum of the Allies, dated the 13th of March, and I
remember having expressed that opinion to M. de Talleyrand. I saw him on
the 14th, and found him engaged in perusing some intelligence he had just
received from the Duke of Vicenza, announcing, as beyond all doubt, the
early signature of peace. Caulaincourt had received orders to come to a
conclusion. Napoleon, he said, had given him a carte blanche to save the
capital, and avoid a battle, by which the last resources of the nation
would be endangered. This seemed pretty positive, to be sure; but even
this assurance did not, for a moment, alter my opinion. The better to
convince me, M. de Talleyrand gave me Caulaincourt's letter to read.
After reading it I confidently said, "He will never sign the conditions."
M. de Talleyrand could not help thinking me very obstinate in my opinion,
for he judged of what the Emperor would do by his situation, while I
judged by his character. I told M. de Talleyrand that Caulaincourt might
have received written orders to sign; for the sake of showing them to the
Plenipotentiaries of the Allies, but that I had no doubt he had been
instructed to postpone coming to a conclusion, and to wait for final
orders. I added, that I saw no reason to change my opinion, and that I
continued to regard the breaking up of the Congress as nearer than
appearances seemed to indicate. Accordingly, three days afterwards, the
Allies grew tired of the delay and the conferences were broken up. Thus
Napoleon sacrificed everything rather than his glory. He fell from a
great height, but he never, by his signature, consented to any
dismemberment of France.

The Plenipotentiaries of the Allies, convinced that these renewed
difficulties and demands had no other object but to gain time, stated