was well known latterly on the Continent, and besides, your nation
possesses courage and energy. As to the Prussians, Belgians, and others,
half the number of my troops, were sufficient to beat them. I only left
34,000 men to take care of the Prussians. The chief causes of the loss
of that battle were, first of all, Grouchy's great tardiness and neglect
in executing his orders; next, the 'grenadiers a cheval' and the cavalry
under General Guyot, which I had in reserve, and which were never to
leave me, engaged without orders and without my knowledge; so that after
the last charge, when the troops were beaten and the English cavalry
advanced, I had not a single corps of cavalry in reserve to resist them,
instead of one which I esteemed to be equal to double their own number.
In consequence of this the English attacked, succeeded, and all was lost.
There was no means of rallying. The youngest general would not have
committed the fault of leaving an army entirely without reserve, which,
however, occurred here, whether in consequence of treason or not I cannot
say. These were the two principal causes of the loss of the battle of
Waterloo."

"If Lord Wellington had intrenched himself," continued Napoleon, "I would
not have attacked him. As a general, his plan did not show talent.
He certainly displayed great courage and obstinacy; but a little must
be taken away even from that when you consider that he had no means of
retreat, and that had he made the attempt not a man of his army would
have escaped. First, to the firmness and bravery of his troops, for the
English fought with the greatest courage and obstinacy, he is principally
indebted for the victory, and not to his own conduct as a general; and
next, to the arrival of Blucher, to whom the victory is more to be
attributed than to Wellington, and more credit is due as a general;
because he, although beaten the day before, assembled his troops, and
brought them into action in the evening. I believe, however," continued