immense loss of horses that had been sustained. The most serious danger
at that time arose from the fact that England was the soul of the
coalition of Russia, Prussia, and Sweden against France. Her subsidies
having obtained her the supreme control, nothing could be decided without
consulting her; and I have since learned that even during the pretended
negotiations the British government had declared to the Emperor of Russia
that under the circumstances the conditions of the treaty of Luneville
would be far too favorable to France. All these complications might be
expressed in these words: "We desire war!" War was then waged, or rather
the scourge continued to desolate Germany, and soon threatened and
invaded France. I should, moreover, call attention to the fact that what
contributed to render our position extremely critical in case of reverses
was that Prussia waged on us not simply a war of regular armies, but that
it had now assumed the character of a national war, by the calling out of
the Zandwehr and Zandsturm which made the situation far more dangerous
than against the tactics of the best disciplined army. To so many other
complications was added the fear, soon only too well justified, of seeing
Austria from an inoffensive and unbiased mediator become a declared
enemy.

Before going farther, I deem it best to refer again to two or three
occurrences I have inadvertently omitted which took place during our stay
at Dresden previous to what might be called the second campaign of 1813.
The first of these was the appearance at Dresden of the Duke of Otranto,
whom his Majesty had summoned.

He had been very rarely seen at the Tuileries since the Duke of Rovigo
had replaced him as minister of general police; and I noticed that his
presence at headquarters was a great surprise to every one, as he was
thought to be in complete disgrace. Those who seek to explain the causes