the mains. It won't be easy."

Cowperwood found, as Addison predicted, that it was not such an
easy matter to induce the various stock-holders and directors in
the old companies to come in on any such scheme of reorganization.
A closer, more unresponsive set of men he was satisfied he had
never met. His offer to buy outright at three or four for one
they refused absolutely. The stock in each case was selling from
one hundred and seventy to two hundred and ten, and intrinsically
was worth more every year, as the city was growing larger and its
need of gas greater. At the same time they were suspicious--one
and all--of any combination scheme by an outsider. Who was he?
Whom did he represent? He could make it clear that he had ample
capital, but not who his backers were. The old officers and
directors fancied that it was a scheme on the part of some of the
officers and directors of one of the other companies to get control
and oust them. Why should they sell? Why be tempted by greater
profits from their stock when they were doing very well as it was?
Because of his newness to Chicago and his lack of connection as
yet with large affairs Cowperwood was eventually compelled to turn
to another scheme--that of organizing new companies in the suburbs
as an entering-wedge of attack upon the city proper. Suburbs
such as Lake View and Hyde Park, having town or village councils
of their own, were permitted to grant franchises to water, gas,
and street-railway companies duly incorporated under the laws of
the state. Cowperwood calculated that if he could form separate
and seemingly distinct companies for each of the villages and
towns, and one general company for the city later, he would be in
a position to dictate terms to the older organizations. It was
simply a question of obtaining his charters and franchises before