incorrectly constructed, while in humanity itself all actual signs
of organism,--the centre of feeling or consciousness, are lacking.
{2}

But, in spite of the arbitrariness and incorrectness of the
fundamental assumption of positive philosophy, it was accepted by
the so-called cultivated world with the greatest sympathy. In this
connection, one thing is worthy of note: that out of the works of
Comte, consisting of two parts, of positive philosophy and of
positive politics, only the first was adopted by the learned world,-
-that part which justifieth, on new promises, the existent evil of
human societies; but the second part, treating of the moral
obligations of altruism, arising from the recognition of mankind as
an organism, was regarded as not only of no importance, but as
trivial and unscientific. It was a repetition of the same thing
that had happened in the case of Kant's works. The "Critique of
Pure Reason" was adopted by the scientific crowd; but the "Critique
of Applied Reason," that part which contains the gist of moral
doctrine, was repudiated. In Kant's doctrine, that was accepted as
scientific which subserved the existent evil. But the positive
philosophy, which was accepted by the crowd, was founded on an
arbitrary and erroneous basis, was in itself too unfounded, and
therefore unsteady, and could not support itself alone. And so,
amid all the multitude of the idle plays of thought of the men
professing the so-called science, there presents itself an assertion
equally devoid of novelty, and equally arbitrary and erroneous, to
the effect that living beings, i.e., organisms, have had their rise
in each other,--not only one organism from another, but one from
many; i.e., that in a very long interval of time (in a million of
years, for instance), not only could a duck and a fish proceed from