become British subjects; and through the outer world, that would have
acknowledged the commencement of a great future.

But, if we were actually bound in defensive alliance with Turkey in case
of a war with Russia, why should we occupy Cyprus upon such one-sided
and anomalous conditions, that would frustrate all hopes of commercial
development, for the sake of obtaining a strategical position that would
have been opened to our occupation AS AN ALLY at any moment? On the
other hand, if we distrusted Turkey, and feared that she might coquet
with Russia at some future period, I could see a paramount necessity for
the occupation of Cyprus, and even Egypt; but we were supposed to be,
and I believe were, acting in absolute and mutual good faith as the
protector of Asiatic Turkey, in defensive alliance with the Sultan. In
that position, should we have entered into a war with Russia, there was
no necessity for the occupation and responsibility of any new position,
as every port of the Ottoman dominions, even to the Golden Horn of
Constantinople, would have welcomed our troops and boats with
enthusiasm.

Turkey is a suspicious Power, and the British government may have had to
contend with difficulties that are unknown to the criticising public; it
may have been impossible to have obtained her sanction for the
occupation under other conditions. The possibility of future
complications that might terminate in a close alliance between the
conquered and the victor, may have suggested the necessity for securing
this most important strategical position without delay, upon first
conditions that might subsequently receive modifications. At first sight
the political situation appeared vague, but I determined to examine the
physical geography of Cyprus, and to form my own opinion of its
capabilities.