for Rosecrans's advance. When the full scope of the movement
dawned upon him, Bragg abandoned Chattanooga and gathered his troops
wherever he could reach them from all quarters to concentrate for
the destruction of our army. Bragg never intended his withdrawal
from Chattanooga to be permanent; all the indications he left behind
him pointed that way. None of the bridges were destroyed as he
retired. All storehouses, hospitals, and other buildings used by
his army were left standing, and Rosecrans's mistake was in construing
Bragg's withdrawal to be a demoralized retreat and in ordering his
army to pursue before this was definitely determined. However,
all advices that Rosecrans had were to the effect that the rebels
were in hasty flight and would not stop anywhere north of Dalton,
and that their probable destination was Rome. This information
was sent to him from Washington, and Bragg aided in confirming this
belief by sending numbers of his soldiers as "deserters" into the
Federal lines with the same report.

As late as the 11th, Halleck telegraphed Rosecrans that after he
occupied "the mountain passes to the west of Dalton" it would be
determined what his future movements would be; and on the 13th,
Halleck telegraphed Rosecrans that if Bragg should go to Alabama
he must not be allowed to re-enter Middle Tennessee. On the 13th,
Foster, at Fortress Monroe, telegraphed Halleck that trains of cars
had been running day and night southward for the past thirty-six
hours. On the following day Foster sent Halleck another despatch,
that Longstreet's corps was reported going south, which Meade on the
same day confirmed. Then Halleck sent urgent messages to Hurlbut
and Burnside to move to Rosecrans's support. But it was too late.
These commands were many days' marches away, and at that moment
the Army of the Cumberland was engaged in the earlier movements of