some mistake about it. Instead of sending a short distance to
the rear, or going himself to Rosecrans and finding out just what
was meant by the order, he chose to give it a meaning that it was
never intended to convey, and moved to the rear from the front of
battle, when he knew, as he says in his report, "although I had not
been seriously engaged at any time during the morning, I was well
satisfied the enemy was in considerable force in my immediate front."
Wood says in his official report, "Reynolds's division was posted
on the left of Brannan's division, which in turn was on the left
of the position I was just quitting; I had consequently to pass
my command in the rear of Brannan's division to close up on and go
into the support of Reynolds." If "Reynolds's, division was posted
on the left of Brannan's division," then there was no gap, and no
place for Wood to place his division as ordered, and he knew it. He
could support Reynolds, but to do this he was compelled to disobey
the first part of his order, which IN ITS SPIRIT AND INTENT WAS TO
KEEP HIM ON THE LINE OF BATTLE, simply moving his division to the
left. This space by his own official report he shows was occupied
by Brannan's division, and with this knowledge he undertook to
execute an order that directed him to make an impossible movement
rather than ask an explanation of it from his commanding officer.
No wonder he wanted to keep his order safe where he could produce
it if occasion required. Wood, irritated at the reprimand of
Rosecrans earlier in the day, intent on maintaining his dignity,
chose rather to undertake to carry out an order in the execution
of which he felt safe, so long as he had it in writing and where
he could produce it if occasion demanded it, than to suspend its
execution long enough to ride a short distance to the rear, and find
out just what the order meant; AND TO THIS EXTENT HE IS RESPONSIBLE
for the great disaster which swept the right wing of the Army of