"The original advance of the enemy was through the open country behind
Firely Church and Hook's Farm; I sighted him between the points marked
A A and B B, and his force was divided into two columns, with very
little cover or possibility of communication between them if once the
intervening ground was under fire. I reckoned about 22 to his left and
50 or 60 to his right. [Footnote: Here again the gallant gentleman
errs; this time he magnifies.] Evidently he meant to seize both Firely
Church and Hook's Farm, get his guns into action, and pound my little
force to pieces while it was still practically in the open. He could
reach both these admirable positions before I could hope to get a man
there. There was no effective cover whatever upon my right that would
have permitted an advance up to the church, and so I decided to
concentrate my whole force in a rush upon Hook's Farm, while I staved
off his left with gun fire. I do not believe any strategist whatever
could have bettered that scheme. My guns were at the points marked D C
E, each with five horsemen, and I deployed my infantry in a line between
D and E. The rest of my cavalry I ordered to advance on Hook's Farm from
C. I have shown by arrows on the sketch the course I proposed for my
guns. The gun E was to go straight for its assigned position, and get
into action at once. C was not to risk capture or being put out of
action; its exact position was to be determined by Red's rapidity in
getting up to the farm, and it was to halt and get to work directly it
saw any chance of effective fire.

"Red had now sighted us. Throughout the affair he showed a remarkably
poor stomach for gun-fire, and this was his undoing. Moreover, he was
tempted by the poorness of our cover on our right to attempt to outflank
and enfilade us there. Accordingly, partly to get cover from our two
central guns and partly to outflank us, he sent the whole of his left