determined with them the fate of a whole campaign. By this hasty
judgment they have converted a retreat into a defeat; mistook
generalship for error; while every little advantage purposely given
the enemy, either to weaken their strength by dividing it, embarrass
their councils by multiplying their objects, or to secure a greater
post by the surrender of a less, has been instantly magnified into a
conquest. Thus, by quartering ill policy upon ill principles, they
have frequently promoted the cause they designed to injure, and
injured that which they intended to promote.

It is probable the campaign may open before this number comes from
the press. The enemy have long lain idle, and amused themselves with
carrying on the war by proclamations only. While they continue their
delay our strength increases, and were they to move to action now, it
is a circumstantial proof that they have no reinforcement coming;
wherefore, in either case, the comparative advantage will be ours.
Like a wounded, disabled whale, they want only time and room to die
in; and though in the agony of their exit, it may be unsafe to live
within the flapping of their tail, yet every hour shortens their
date, and lessens their power of mischief. If any thing happens while
this number is in the press, it will afford me a subject for the last
pages of it. At present I am tired of waiting; and as neither the
enemy, nor the state of politics have yet produced any thing new, I
am thereby left in the field of general matter, undirected by any
striking or particular object. This Crisis, therefore, will be made
up rather of variety than novelty, and consist more of things useful
than things wonderful.

The success of the cause, the union of the people, and the means of
supporting and securing both, are points which cannot be too much