prevented her obtaining them. We had no credit abroad, because of our
rebellious dependency. Our ships could claim no protection in foreign
ports, because we afforded them no justifiable reason for granting it
to us. The calling ourselves subjects, and at the same time fighting
against the power which we acknowledged, was a dangerous precedent to
all Europe. If the grievances justified the taking up arms, they
justified our separation; if they did not justify our separation,
neither could they justify our taking up arms. All Europe was
interested in reducing us as rebels, and all Europe (or the greatest
part at least) is interested in supporting us as independent States.
At home our condition was still worse: our currency had no
foundation, and the fall of it would have ruined Whig and Tory alike.
We had no other law than a kind of moderated passion; no other civil
power than an honest mob; and no other protection than the temporary
attachment of one man to another. Had independence been delayed a few
months longer, this continent would have been plunged into
irrecoverable confusion: some violent for it, some against it, till,
in the general cabal, the rich would have been ruined, and the poor
destroyed. It is to independence that every Tory owes the present
safety which he lives in; for by that, and that only, we emerged from
a state of dangerous suspense, and became a regular people.

The necessity, likewise, of being independent, had there been no
rupture between Britain and America, would, in a little time, have
brought one on. The increasing importance of commerce, the weight and
perplexity of legislation, and the entangled state of European
politics, would daily have shown to the continent the impossibility
of continuing subordinate; for, after the coolest reflections on the
matter, this must be allowed, that Britain was too jealous of America
to govern it justly; too ignorant of it to govern it well; and too