concerted the project, among whom was Count de Broglio, and to his
share was given the command of those troops. The character of this
man as described to me in a letter which I communicated to Mr. Burke
before he began to write his book, and from an authority which Mr.
Burke well knows was good, was that of "a high-flying aristocrat,
cool, and capable of every mischief."

While these matters were agitating, the National Assembly stood in
the most perilous and critical situation that a body of men can be
supposed to act in. They were the devoted victims, and they knew it.
They had the hearts and wishes of their country on their side, but
military authority they had none. The guards of Broglio surrounded
the hall where the Assembly sat, ready, at the word of command, to
seize their persons, as had been done the year before to the
Parliament of Paris. Had the National Assembly deserted their trust,
or had they exhibited signs of weakness or fear, their enemies had
been encouraged and their country depressed. When the situation they
stood in, the cause they were engaged in, and the crisis then ready
to burst, which should determine their personal and political fate
and that of their country, and probably of Europe, are taken into one
view, none but a heart callous with prejudice or corrupted by
dependence can avoid interesting itself in their success.

The Archbishop of Vienne was at this time President of the National
Assembly- a person too old to undergo the scene that a few days or a
few hours might bring forth. A man of more activity and bolder
fortitude was necessary, and the National Assembly chose (under the
form of a Vice-President, for the Presidency still resided in the
Archbishop) M. de la Fayette; and this is the only instance of a
Vice-President being chosen. It was at the moment that this storm was