them is defective. They answer not his purpose. A man, by natural
right, has a right to judge in his own cause; and so far as the right
of the mind is concerned, he never surrenders it. But what availeth
it him to judge, if he has not power to redress? He therefore
deposits this right in the common stock of society, and takes the ann
of society, of which he is a part, in preference and in addition to
his own. Society grants him nothing. Every man is a proprietor in
society, and draws on the capital as a matter of right.

From these premisses two or three certain conclusions will follow:

First, That every civil right grows out of a natural right; or, in
other words, is a natural right exchanged.

Secondly, That civil power properly considered as such is made up of
the aggregate of that class of the natural rights of man, which
becomes defective in the individual in point of power, and answers
not his purpose, but when collected to a focus becomes competent to
the Purpose of every one.

Thirdly, That the power produced from the aggregate of natural
rights, imperfect in power in the individual, cannot be applied to
invade the natural rights which are retained in the individual, and
in which the power to execute is as perfect as the right itself.

We have now, in a few words, traced man from a natural individual to
a member of society, and shown, or endeavoured to show, the quality
of the natural rights retained, and of those which are exchanged for
civil rights. Let us now apply these principles to governments.