a nation. Yet it would not be an unprofitable speculation if
for a moment we paused to consider what might have been the
consequences to our country if Mr Pitt had been content for a
season again to lead the Commons under Lord Shelburne, and
have secured for England the unrivalled knowledge and
dexterity of that statesman in the conduct of our affairs
during the confounding fortunes of the French revolution.
Lord Shelburne was the only English minister competent to the
task; he was the only public man who had the previous
knowledge requisite to form accurate conclusions on such a
conjuncture: his remaining speeches on the subject attest the
amplitude of his knowledge and the accuracy of his views: and
in the rout of Jena, or the agony of Austerlitz, one cannot
refrain from picturing the shade of Shelburne haunting the
cabinet of Pitt, as the ghost of Canning is said occasionally
to linger about the speaker's chair, and smile sarcastically
on the conscientious mediocrities who pilfered his hard-earned
honours.

But during the happier years of Mr Pitt, the influence of the
mind of Shelburne may be traced throughout his policy. It was
Lansdowne House that made Pitt acquainted with Dr Price, a
dissenting minister, whom Lord Shelburne when at the head of
affairs courageously offered to make his private secretary,
and who furnished Mr Pitt, among many other important
suggestions, with his original plan of the sinking fund. The
commercial treaties of '87 were struck in the same mint, and
are notable as the first effort made by the English government
to emancipate the country from the restrictive policy which
had been introduced by the "glorious revolution;" memorable