without regarding our own interests. "Yet," argues our opponent,
"you say that we ought to choose with care the persons upon whom we
bestow benefits, because neither do husbandmen sow seed in the
sand: now if this be true, we follow our own interest in bestowing
benefits, just as much as in ploughing and sowing: for sowing is
not desirable in itself. Besides this you inquire where and how you
ought to bestow a benefit, which would not need to be done if the
bestowal of a benefit was desirable in itself: because in whatever
place and whatever manner it might be bestowed, it still would be
a benefit." We seek to do honourable acts, solely because they are
honourable; yet even though we need think of nothing else, we
consider to whom we shall do them, and when, and how; for in these
points the act has its being. In like manner, when I choose upon
whom I shall bestow a benefit, and when I aim at making it a
benefit; because if it were bestowed upon a base person, it could
neither be a benefit nor an honourable action.

X. To restore what has been entrusted to one is desirable in
itself; yet I shall not always restore it, nor shall I do so in any
place or at any time you please. Sometimes it makes no difference
whether I deny that I have received it, or return it openly. I
shall consider the interests of the person to whom I am to return
it, and shall deny that I have received a deposit, which would
injure him if returned. I shall act in the same manner in bestowing
a benefit: I shall consider when to give it, to whom, in what
manner, and on what grounds. Nothing ought to be done without a
reason: a benefit is not truly so, if it be bestowed without a
reason, since reason accompanies all honorable action. How often do
we hear men reproaching themselves for some thoughtless gift, and
saying, "I had rather have thrown it away than have given it to