son for me; had he perished, I could not have survived him?" Do you
not owe a benefit for the life of one whose safety you value above
your own? Moreover, should I save your son's life, you would fall
down before my knees, and would pay vows to heaven as though you
yourself had been saved; you would say, "It makes no difference
whether you have saved mine or me; you have saved us both, yet me
more than him." Why do you say this, if you do not receive a
benefit?

A.D. Because, if my son were to contract a loan, I should pay his
creditor, yet I should not, therefore, be indebted to him; or if my
son were taken in adultery, I should blush, yet I should not,
therefore, be an adulterer. I say that I am under an obligation to
you for saving my son, not because I really am, but because I am
willing to constitute myself your debtor of my own free will. On
the other hand I have derived from his safety the greatest possible
pleasure and advantage, and I have escaped that most dreadful blow,
the loss of my child. True, but we are not now discussing whether
you have done me any good or not, but whether you have bestowed a
benefit upon me; for animals, stones, and herbs can do one good,
but do not bestow benefits, which can only be given by one who
wishes well to the receiver. Now you do not wish well to the
father, but only to the son; and sometimes you do not even know the
father. So when you have said, "Have I not bestowed a benefit upon
the father by saving the son?" you ought to meet this with, "Have
I, then, bestowed a benefit upon a father whom I do not know, whom
I never thought of?" And what will you say when, as is sometimes the
case, you hate the father, and yet save his son? Can you be thought
to have bestowed a benefit upon one whom you hated most bitterly
while you were bestowing it?