return the benefit to him, and nevertheless to avenge myself upon
him, having, as it were, two distinct accounts open with him, or to
mix them both together, and do nothing, leaving the benefit to be
wiped out by the injury, the injury by the benefit? I see that the
former course is adopted by the law of the land; you know best what
the law may be among you Stoic philosophers in such a case. I
suppose that you keep the action which I bring against another
distinct from that which he Strings against me, and the two
processes are not merged into one? For instance, if a man entrusts
me with money, and afterwards robs me, I shall bring an action
against him for theft, and he will bring one against me for
unlawfully detaining his property?"

VI. The cases which you have mentioned, my Liberalis, come under
well-established laws, which it is necessary for us to follow. One
law cannot be merged in another: each one proceeds its own way.
There is a particular action which deals with deposits just as
there is one which deals with theft. A benefit is subject to no
law; it depends upon my own arbitration. I am at liberty to
contrast the amount of good or harm which any one may have done me,
and then to decide which of us is indebted to the other. In legal
processes we ourselves have no power, we must go whither they lead
us; in the case of a benefit the supreme power is mine, I pronounce
sentence. Consequently I do not separate or distinguish between
benefits and wrongs, but send them before the same judge. Unless I
did so, you would bid me love and hate, give thanks and make
complaints at the same time, which human nature does not admit of.
I would rather compare the benefit and the injury with one another,
and see whether there were any balance in my favour. If anybody
puts lines of other writing upon my manuscript he conceals, though